When Banks Wait: Strategic Delay for Distressed Loan Resolution
Job Market Paper
Presented at: Yiran Fan Memorial Conference 2026; MFR Program Summer Session for Young Scholars 2026 (poster session).
Why do delayed loan resolution and low trading activity in collateral markets occur together after a sectoral shock? This paper proposes a price-discovery mechanism to explain these patterns. I develop a dynamic model of loan resolution in which resolving a loan reveals information that other banks can use to obtain higher expected prices from risk-averse developers. Price discovery therefore becomes a public good. Banks have incentives to wait for others to resolve their loans, while earlier resolutions encourage more resolutions in subsequent periods. When initial uncertainty is high, these incentives can prolong distress and sustain low trading activity. I test three predictions of the model using loan-level data from the commercial real estate market following the rise of work from home. First, earlier loan resolutions in a local market predict fewer loan extensions in subsequent periods, regardless of whether the price news is good or bad. Second, for resolutions involving property sales, this relationship is significantly stronger in states where transaction prices are publicly disclosed. Third, an additional prior resolution is associated with a larger proportional increase in subsequent resolution probability in markets with greater exposure to work from home. Together, these findings support a mechanism whereby individually optimal waiting for information can lead to a persistently cold market and delayed resolution of distressed loans.